Here are some comments on two games I played in a row, rounds 6 and 7, on the first day of the '92 World Championships in Barcelona. These games illustrate how two of the so called ``killer bees'' where killed themselves using the same opening, which might explain the title. [ The Handel-Tastet game doesn't fit in with this picture of reality, and hence is not mentioned. The author seems somehow to have got the impression that this is normal practice. -- Ed.]
Let's start with the Tastet-Feinstein game from round 6.
1e6 to 10g4: The 8f6 move is the Rose opening, a very classical one after which moves 9 and 10 are almost always played this way.
11g5: This move is the Greenberg variation, after the name of an American player who used it in 1983 to defeat Brian Rose. This variation was a bit out of fashion because it was considered as a losing opening for Black. It made a spectacular come-back at the '92 World Championships because both the Italian player Francesco Marconi and I independently decided to play it again.
12g3 to 16h3: Very classical continuation after the Greenberg. You can reach the same position after move 15 by switching moves 12 and 14.
After 16h3.
17h2: Here is the novelty, the standard move being 17g6. I learned this move when Vladimir Polyakov (whose name I had never heard before) played it against me and beat me in last summer's Chelyabinsk Open. (By the way, if you have the opportunity to travel to Russia one year, don't miss it! You can get details from Imre Leader, who was there with me. We both very much enjoyed our stay there.) In Barcelona, Marconi played 17d7 which might also be an interesting variation. Maybe the Greenberg had been buried too quickly?
18b5: This is one of the two standard replies, the other one being h5.
19f2 to 21g6: Playing the pair f2 f1 before playing g6 has the advantage of installing a white disc at f4 so that if White answers 22h6, he also flips g5 and loses access to h5, which wouldn't have happened had Black played 17g6 or 19g6.
22d7 and 23f7: Very natural moves. We had reached the same position in the Polyakov-Tastet game from Chelyabinsk and we'll reach it again in the next game.
After 23f7.
24f8 and 25e7: White threatens to play h7 followed by h5 and Black prevents it.
26d7: In Chelyabinsk, I had played 26e2 but I was completely dead out of the opening; Joel's move is probably better.
27b4 to 31c7: Black needs to win a tempo somewhere. I was very happy to find the elegant sequence from 27 to 31 achieving this aim. The key move of this sequence is 31c7 which gives White access to b6 but simultaneously poisons this move because now it would also flip c5, d4 and e3.
32c3 to 36c2: Move 32 is a bit surprising, but is consistent with Imre Leader's flat wall theory. Anyway, it's not easy to find moves for White.
After 36c2.
37g2: This move didn't surprise Joel. Of course, it would be stupid to try to surprise Joel playing an X-square! If you want him surprised, don't play an X-square because this is the first move he expects!
38b6 and 39h5: One of the aims of 37g2 was to get access to h5. So, maybe at 38 White should have played h5 himself!
40c8 to 44h6: At first sight, White's play doesn't look very consistent, because first he doesn't want to take the h1 corner at 40 and then he sets a Stoner trap to get it! However, there is a big difference: if White takes the corner at 40, he loses access to g1 and might lose parity there because Black can wait to play in the hole. After 41b7, Black controls the diagonal and White won't flip g2 when he plays h1, forcing Black to reply with g1.
45a2: This move is not risky because b6 is white, so that when White plays a8, he won't have access to a7.
46b2: White has only two sensible moves, h1 and b2 but he chose the wrong one; 46h1 loses only 39-25.
47a7 to 50a8: Black chooses a sequence which semi-forces white moves (and happens to be the best one). Black is in full control of the game.
51a1: This move did surprise Joel because he missed the fact that my move 49 had flipped the disc at d4 and he thought I had no access to the corner. Though he had only one legal move at 52, he spent about half a minute before playing it because he was trying to understand how he missed that and then convinced himself that 46 was a mistake.
After 52b1.
53h8 and 54g8: Both moves are non-optimal, (at least if the objective is to have the greatest number of discs at the end). In this sense, 53c1 and 54h7 were better. 53h8 is wrong because it allows White to keep discs on the b1-h7 diagonal and 54g8 is wrong because it gives back the same discs to Black!
55e8 to 60h7: Perfect endgame. White has no choice and Black plays so as to have all the c column black in case it's better to play 58d1 instead of c1 but it isn't.
Now it's round 7 and I have to play David Shaman, who has won all his games so far. I'm second alone with only one defeat (vs Sakaguchi) and several players have 4 points out of 6.
I'm Black again, and as it worked well with Joel, I play the same opening and the game plays the same way to move 23, so you can start from the diagram above after move 23.
24g8: This is a trendy move (see Glossary in New York, New York). It looks bad at first glance because White might lose the h8 corner after this move. But actually, it isn't that surprising: Black has potentially a five on the eastern edge because White can play h5 when he wants and Black must reply h6 or lose the h1 corner. If Black threatens to take h8, White can give Black the five and then he'll be able to wedge at h7 if Black takes the corner anyway. However, it turns out that 24g8 is a bad move after all.
25e7 to 28d7: So, I don't try to take the h8 corner, but I leave White without a move on the southern edge and with a weak position there.
29b4 to 33c7: At this point, I realise that the position is very similar to what it was in the previous game at move 26. Actually, the only difference is that there are two extra discs: a black one at d8 and a white one at g8. But they don't really change the position and I can solve my problem (win a tempo) in exactly the same way. So I play exactly the same sequence.
After 33c7.
34h6: David doesn't want to open the northern part of the board. 34b8 would be met by 35b6, so White finally plays 34h6, probably a bit reluctantly.
35g2: This is a thematic move, given the position on the eastern edge: if 36h1, 37h5 and Black has won a tempo (and maybe also parity with g1 being an odd hole where White cannot play). It's very important that White has no access to h5, otherwise he could play there before taking the h1 corner and Black would have lost everything: he couldn't wedge on the eastern edge. It's a classic mistake that might cost you a game some day (if it hasn't done already), if you don't take care.
36c3: This move takes advantage of the fact that 35 flipped f3 which was poisoning c3. However, it leaves Black an easy reply.
37e8: I'm preparing a nasty surprise for White at move 40. I must admit I hadn't seen it coming when I played 35g2 and certainly David hadn't either, since otherwise he wouldn't have played 36c3. You can try and guess what the surprise is.
38h1: This move is nearly forced if White doesn't want to play c8 and close all the south-west region. On any move other than these two, Black can just take h8.
39h5: It's much better to wedge than to take h8 corner. Can you see the surprise now?
After 39h5.
40c8: White probably wanted to play 40g7, winning a much needed tempo and keeping parity in the south-east region, but 41h8 would leave him without access to h7! Moreover, 40h7 41h8 leaves him without access to g7! As he cannot play in the south-east region, White is forced to play c8, otherwise I take the h8 corner and it's even worse. Finally at move 40 we discover that move 24 was bad, but of course it was impossible to foresee. Let's say that 24g8 was a Shaman move (see again Glossary in New York, New York).
41g7: makes the win safer by winning a tempo in the south-east region and preventing White from doing it himself.
42h8 and 43h7: I didn't think White would be in a hurry to play this pair out and give me definitely the eastern edge. He could have waited, hoping that parity would force me to play h7 and give him the edge, though this is not very likely as White has lost control of the game. However, in the best sequence, found with a computer, White does play the last move in the south-east region, but it's Black h8 followed by White h7. So, 42c2 loses 41-23 after g1 e2 a5 a7 b6 b7 a8 b8 h8 h7 d1 e1 a2 c1 d2 b2 a1 b1, White keeping parity everywhere.
44c2: Semi-forced: it's the only move that flips only one of the two discs in the North.
46d2: e2 saved two more discs (43-21) after playing a sequence very similar to what happened in the game.
48a7: b6 kept parity for White and saved two more discs (45-19) after 49a2 b2 a1 b1 c1 d1 b7 a7 e2 e1 a8 b8.
After 50b7.
51e1: This choice might look surprising at first glance: why does Black, being wedged with g1, choose to lose his wedge? It's to win parity! After 52d1 and 53e2, White passes and there is an odd hole in the north-west where Black will play the last move. After 51e1, the endgame is perfect: White has no more choice and Black wins 41-23. Actually this move 51 is not that good for two reasons. The first one is that Black can have as many discs without parity playing 51e2 e1 a8 b8 a2 b2 57a1 b1 c1 d1 also winning 41-23! Notice, however, that as Black didn't have parity he couldn't use his wedge at g1 to get discs on the northern edge. The second reason is that Black can improve the previous sequence so as to win parity: instead of 57a1, he can take advantage of the b column which is all white and play 57b1! White answers with one of c1 or d1, it doesn't matter, Black takes the a1 corner, White passes and Black plays the last move of the game, winning 47-17. This way, Black got the whole northern edge (except of course h1) thanks to parity and his wedge at g1. This is very classical: such a wedge is useful only when you have parity.
This was to be David's only loss in the 13 rounds of the Swiss system.